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Abstract: Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact
representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited
due to negative theoretical results: a Nash equilibrium does not have to exist, computing maxmin strategies is
NP-hard, and they may require irrational numbers. We present the first algorithm for approximating maxmin
strategies in two-player zero-sum imperfect recall games without absentmindedness. We modify the well-
known sequence-form linear program to model strategies in imperfect recall games resulting in a bilinear
program and use a recent technique to approximate the bilinear terms. Our main algorithm is a branch-and-
bound search that provably reaches the desired approximation after an exponential number of steps in the size
of the game. Experimental evaluation shows that the proposed algorithm can approximate maxmin strategies
of randomly generated imperfect recall games of sizes beyond toy-problems within few minutes.
1 INTRODUCTION
The extensive form is a well-known representation
of dynamic strategic interactions that evolve in time.
Games in the extensive form (extensive-form games;
EFGs) are visualized as game trees, where nodes
correspond to states of the game and edges to ac-
tions executed by players. This representation is
general enough to model stochastic events and im-
perfect information when players are unable to dis-
tinguish among several states. Recent years have
seen advancements in algorithms for computing so-
lution concepts in large zero-sum extensive-form
games (e.g., solving heads-up limit texas hold’em
poker (Bowling et al., 2015)).
Most of the algorithms for finding optimal
strategies in EFGs assume that players remem-
ber all information gained during the course of
the game (Zinkevich et al., 2008; Hoda et al., 2010;
Bosˇansky´ et al., 2014). This assumption is known as
perfect recall and has a significant impact on theoret-
ical properties of finding optimal strategies in EFGs.
Namely, there is an equivalence between two types of
strategies in perfect recall games – mixed strategies
(probability distributions over pure strategies1) and
1A pure strategy in an EFG is an assignment of an action
to play in each decision point.
behavioral strategies (probability distributions over
actions in each decision point) (Kuhn, 1953). This
equivalence guarantees that a Nash equilibrium (NE)
exists in behavioral strategies in perfect recall games
(the proof of the existence of NE deals with mixed
strategies only (Nash, 1950)) and it is exploited by al-
gorithms for computing a NE in zero-sum EFGs with
perfect recall – the well-known sequence-form linear
program (Koller et al., 1996; von Stengel, 1996).
The caveat of perfect recall is that remembering
all information increases the number of decision
points (and consequently the size of a behavioral
strategy) exponentially with the number of moves
in the game. One possibility for tackling the size of
perfect recall EFGs is to create an abstracted game
where certain decision points are merged together,
solve this abstracted game, and then translate the
strategy from the abstracted game into the origi-
nal game (e.g., see (Gilpin and Sandholm, 2007;
Kroer and Sandholm, 2014;
Kroer and Sandholm, 2016)). However, devising
abstracted games that have imperfect recall is de-
sirable due to the reduced size. One then must
compute behavioral strategies in order to exploit the
reduced size (mixed strategies already operate over
an exponentially large set of pure strategies).
Solving imperfect recall games has several
fundamental problems. The best known game-
theoretic solution concept, a Nash equilibrium (NE),
does not have to exist even in zero-sum games
(see (Wichardt, 2008) for a simple example) and stan-
dard algorithms (e.g., a Counterfactual Regret Min-
imization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al., 2008)) can con-
verge to incorrect strategies (see Example 1). There-
fore, we focus on finding a strategy that guarantees
the best possible expected outcome for a player –
a maxmin strategy. However, computing a maxmin
strategy is NP-hard and such strategies may require
irrational numbers even when the input uses only ra-
tional numbers (Koller and Megiddo, 1992).
Existing works avoid these negative results by cre-
ating very specific abstracted games so that perfect
recall algorithms are still applicable. One example
is a subset of imperfect recall games called (skewed)
well-formed games, motivated by the poker do-
main, in which the standard perfect-recall algorithms
(e.g., CFR) are still guaranteed to find an approxi-
mate Nash behavioral strategy (Lanctot et al., 2012;
Kroer and Sandholm, 2016). The restrictions on
games to form (skewed) well-formed games are, how-
ever, rather strict and can prevent us from creat-
ing sufficiently small abstracted games. To fully
explore the possibilities of exploiting the concept
of abstractions and/or other compactly represented
dynamic games (e.g., Multi-Agent Influence Dia-
grams (Koller and Milch, 2003)), a new algorithm for
solving imperfect recall games is required.
1.1 Our Contribution
We advance the state of the art and provide
the first approximate algorithm for computing
maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games (since
maxmin strategies might require irrational num-
bers (Koller and Megiddo, 1992), finding exact
maxmin has fundamental difficulties). We assume
imperfect recall games with no absentmindedness,
which means that each decision point in the game
can be visited at most once during the course of the
game and it is arguably a natural assumption in finite
games (see, e.g., (Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997) for
a detailed discussion). The main goal of our approach
is to find behavioral strategies that maximize the
expected outcome of player 1 against an opponent
that minimizes the outcome. We base our formula-
tion on the sequence-form linear program for perfect
recall games (Koller et al., 1996; von Stengel, 1996)
and we extend it with bilinear constraints necessary
for the correct representation of strategies of player
1 in imperfect recall games. We approximate the
bilinear terms using recent Multiparametric Disag-
gregation Technique (MDT) (Kolodziej et al., 2013)
and provide a mixed-integer linear program (MILP)
for approximating maxmin strategies. Finally, we
consider a linear relaxation of the MILP and propose
a branch-and-bound algorithm that (1) repeatedly
solves this linear relaxation and (2) tightens the
constraints that approximate bilinear terms as well
as relaxed binary variables from the MILP. We
show that the branch-and-bound algorithm ends after
exponentially many steps while guaranteeing the
desired precision.
Our algorithm approximates maxmin strategies
for player 1 having generic imperfect recall with-
out absentmindedness and we give two variants of
the algorithm depending on the type of imperfect
recall of the opponent. If the opponent, player 2,
has either a perfect recall or so-called A-loss re-
call (Kaneko and Kline, 1995; Kline, 2002), the lin-
ear program solved by the branch-and-bound algo-
rithm has a polynomial size in the size of the game. If
player 2 has a generic imperfect recall without absent-
mindedness, the linear program solved by the branch-
and-bound algorithm can be exponentially large.
We provide a short experimental evaluation to
demonstrate that our algorithm can solve games far
beyond the size of toy problems. Randomly gener-
ated imperfect recall games with up to 5 · 103 states
can be typically solved within few minutes.
All the technical proofs can be found in the ap-
pendix or in the full version of this paper.
2 TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
Before describing our algorithm we define extensive-
form games, different types of recall, and describe the
approximation technique for the bilinear terms.
A two-player extensive-form game (EFG) is a tu-
ple G= (N ,H ,Z,A ,u,C ,I). N = {1,2} is a set of
players, by i we refer to one of the players, and by
−i to his opponent. H denotes a finite set of histo-
ries of actions taken by all players and chance from
the root of the game. Each history corresponds to a
node in the game tree; hence, we use terms history
and node interchangeably. We say that h is a prefix
of h′ (h ⊑ h′) if h lies on a path from the root of the
game tree to h′. Z ⊆H is the set of terminal states of
the game. A denotes the set of all actions. An ordered
list of all actions of player i from root to h is referred
to as a sequence, σi = seqi(h), Σi is a set of all se-
quences of i. For each z ∈ Z we define a utility func-
tion ui : Z → R for each player i (ui(z) = −u−i(z) in
zero-sum games). The chance player selects actions
based on a fixed probability distribution known to all
players. Function C : H → [0,1] is the probability of
reaching h due to chance.
Imperfect observation of player i is modeled via
information sets Ii that form a partition over h ∈ H
where i takes action. Player i cannot distinguish be-
tween nodes in any Ii ∈ Ii. A(Ii) denotes actions
available in each h ∈ Ii. The action a uniquely identi-
fies the information set where it is available. We use
seqi(Ii) as a set of all sequences of player i leading to
Ii. Finally, we use infi(σi) to be a set of all information
sets to which sequence σi leads.
A behavioral strategy βi ∈ Bi is a probability dis-
tribution over actions in each information set I ∈ Ii.
We use ui(β) = ui(βi,β−i) for the expected outcome
of the game for i when players follow β. A best
response of player i against β−i is a strategy β
BR
i ∈
BRi(β−i), where ui(β
BR
i ,β−i)≥ ui(β
′
i,β−i) for all β
′
i ∈
Bi. βi(I,a) is the probability of playing a in I, β(h)
denotes the probability that h is reached when both
players play according to β and due to chance.
We say that βi and β
′
i are realization equivalent if
for any β−i, ∀z ∈ Z β(z) = β
′(z), where β = (βi,β−i)
and β′ = (β′i,β−i).
A maxmin strategy β∗i is defined as β
∗
i =
argmaxβi∈Bi minβ−i∈B−i ui(βi,β−i). Note that when a
Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies exists in a
two-player zero-sum imperfect recall game then β∗i is
a Nash equilibrium strategy for i.
2.1 Types of Recall
We now briefly define types of recall in EFGs and
state several lemmas and observations about charac-
teristics of strategies in imperfect recall EFGs that are
later exploited by our algorithm.
In perfect recall, all players remember the history
of their own actions and all information gained during
the course of the game. As a consequence, all nodes
in any information set Ii have the same sequence for
player i. If the assumption of perfect recall does not
hold, we talk about games with imperfect recall. In
imperfect recall games, mixed and behavioral strate-
gies are not comparable (Kuhn, 1953). However, in
games without absentmindedness (AM) where each
information set is encountered at most once during
the course of the game, the following observation al-
low us to consider only pure best responses of the op-
ponent when computing maxmin strategies:
Lemma 1. Let G be an imperfect recall game with-
out AM and β1 strategy of player 1. There exists
an ex ante (i.e., when evaluating only the expected
value of the strategy) pure behavioral best response
of player 2.
The proof is in the full version of the paper.
This lemma is applied when a mathematical pro-
gram for computing maxmin strategies is formulated
– strategies of player 2 can be considered as con-
straints using pure best responses. Note that this
is not true in general imperfect recall games – in
games with AM, an ex ante best response may need to
be randomized (e.g., in the game with absentminded
driver (Piccione and Rubinstein, 1997)).
A disadvantage of using pure best responses as
constraints for the minimizing player is that there
are exponentially many pure best responses in the
size of the game. In perfect recall games, this can
be avoided by formulating best-response constraints
such that the opponent is playing the best action in
each information set. However, this type of response,
termed time consistent strategy (Kline, 2002), does
not have to be an ex ante best response in general
imperfect recall games (see (Kline, 2002) for an ex-
ample). A class of imperfect recall games where it is
sufficient to consider only time consistent strategies
when computing best responses was termed as A-loss
recall games (Kaneko and Kline, 1995; Kline, 2002).
Definition 1. Player i has A-loss recall if and only if
for every I ∈ Ii and nodes h,h′ ∈ I it holds either (1)
seqi(h) = seqi(h
′), or (2) ∃I′ ∈ Ii and two distinct
actions a,a′ ∈ Ai(I
′),a 6= a′ such that a ∈ seqi(h)∧
a′ ∈ seqi(h
′).
Condition (1) in the definition says that if player i
has perfect recall then she also has A-loss recall. Con-
dition (2) requires that each loss of memory of A-loss
recall player can be traced back to some loss of mem-
ory of the player’s own previous actions.
The equivalence between time consistent strate-
gies and ex ante best responses allows us to simplify
the best responses of player 2 in case she has A-
loss recall. Formally, it is sufficient to consider best
responses that correspond to the best response in a
coarsest perfect-recall refinement of the imperfect re-
call game when computing best response for a player
with A-loss recall. By a coarsest perfect recall re-
finement of an imperfect recall game G we define a
perfect recall game G′ where we split the imperfect
recall information sets to biggest subsets still fulfill-
ing the perfect recall.
Definition 2. The coarsest perfect re-
call refinement G′ of the imperfect recall
game G = {N ,H ,Z,A ,u,C ,I} is a tuple
{N ,H ,Z,A ′,u,C ,I ′}, where ∀i ∈ N ∀Ii ∈ Ii
H(Ii) partitions information set Ii such that
H(Ii) = {H1, ...,Hn} is a disjoint parti-
tion of all h ∈ Ii, where
⋃n
j=1H j = Ii and
∀H j ∈ H(Ii) ∀hk,hl ∈ H j : seqi(hk) = seqi(hl) and
∀hk ∈Hk,hl ∈Hl :Hk∩Hl = /0⇒ seqi(hk) 6= seqi(hl).
Each set from H(Ii) corresponds to an information
set I′i ∈ I
′
i . Moreover, A
′ is a modification of A
guaranteeing ∀I ∈ I ′ ∀hk,hl ∈ I A ′(hk) = A ′(hl),
while for all distinct Ik, Il ∈ I ′ A(Ik) 6= A(Il).
Note that we can restrict the coarsest perfect re-
call refinement only for i by splitting only information
sets of i (information sets of −i remain unchanged).
Finally, we assume that there is a mapping between
actions from the coarsest perfect recall refinement A ′
and actions in the original game A so that we can
identify to which actions from A ′ an original action
a ∈ A maps. We assume this mapping to be implicit
since it is clear from the context.
Lemma 2. Let G be an imperfect recall game where
player 2 has A-loss recall and β1 is a strategy of
player 1, and let G′ be the coarsest perfect recall re-
finement of G for player 2. Let β′2 be a pure best re-
sponse in G′ and let β2 be a realization equivalent be-
havioral strategy in G, then β2 is a pure best response
to β1 in G.
The proof is in the full version of the paper.
Note that the NP-hardness proof of
computing maxmin strategies due to
Koller (Koller and Megiddo, 1992) still applies,
since we assume the maximizing player to have
generic imperfect recall and the reduction provided
by Koller results in a game where the maximizing
player has generic imperfect recall while the mini-
mizing player has perfect recall, which is a special
case of both settings assumed in our paper.
Finally, let us show that CFR cannot be applied
in these settings. This is caused by the fact that CFR
iteratively minimizes per information set regret terms
(counterfactual regrets). Since in perfect recall games
the sum of counterfactual regrets provides an upper
bound on the external regret, this minimization is
guaranteed to converge to a strategy profile with 0 ex-
ternal regret. In imperfect recall games, however, the
sum of counterfactual regrets no longer forms an up-
per bound on the external regret (Lanctot et al., 2012),
and the minimization of these regret terms can, there-
fore, lead to a strategy profile with a non-zero external
regret.
Example 1: Consider the A-loss recall game in Figure
1. When setting the x> 2, one of the strategy profiles
with zero counterfactual regret (and therefore a pro-
file to which CFR can converge) is mixing uniformly
between both a, b and g, h, while player 2 plays d,
e deterministically. By setting the utility x as some
large number, this strategy profile can have expected
utility arbitrarily worse than the maxmin value −1.
The reason is the presence of the conflicting outcomes
for some action in an imperfect recall information set
that cannot be generally avoided, or easily detected in
imperfect recall games.
Figure 1: An A-loss recall game where CFR finds a strategy
with the expected utility arbitrarily distant from the maxmin
value.
2.2 Approximating Bilinear Terms
The final technical tool that we use in our al-
gorithm is the approximation of bilinear terms
by Multiparametric Disaggregation Technique
(MDT) (Kolodziej et al., 2013) for approximat-
ing bilinear constraints. The main idea of the
approximation is to use a digit-wise discretiza-
tion of one of the variables from a bilinear term.
The main advantage of this approximation is a
low number of newly introduced integer variables
and an experimentally confirmed speed-up over
the standard technique of piecewise McCormick
envelopes (Kolodziej et al., 2013).
9
∑
k=0
wk,ℓ = 1 ℓ ∈ Z (1a)
wk,ℓ ∈{0,1} (1b)
∑
ℓ∈Z
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k ·wk,ℓ = b (1c)
cL ·wk,ℓ ≤ cˆk,ℓ ≤ c
U ·wk,ℓ ∀ℓ ∈ Z,∀k ∈ 0..9 (1d)
9
∑
k=0
cˆk,ℓ = c ∀ℓ ∈ Z (1e)
∑
ℓ∈Z
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k · cˆk,ℓ = a (1f)
Let a = bc be a bilinear term. MDT discretizes
variable b and introduces new binary variables wk,l
that indicate whether the digit on ℓ-th position is k.
Constraint (1a) ensures that for each position ℓ there
is exactly one digit chosen. All digits must sum to
b (Constraint (1c)). Next, we introduce variables cˆk,ℓ
that are equal to c for such k and ℓ where wk,l = 1,
and cˆk,ℓ = 0 otherwise. c
L and cU are bounds on the
value of variable c. The value of a is given by Con-
straint (1f).
This is an exact formulation that requires in-
finite sums and an infinite number of constraints.
However, by restricting the set of all possible po-
sitions ℓ to a finite set {PL, . . . ,PU} we get a
lower bound approximation. Following the approach
in (Kolodziej et al., 2013) we can extend the lower
bound formulation to compute an upper bound:
Constraints (1a),(1d),(1e)
∑
ℓ∈{PL,...,PU}
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k ·wk,ℓ+∆b= b (2a)
0≤ ∆b≤ 10PL (2b)
∑
ℓ∈{PL,...,PU}
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k · cˆk,ℓ+∆a= a (2c)
cL ·∆b≤ ∆a≤ cU ·∆b (2d)(
c−cU
)
·10PL +cU ·∆b≤ ∆a (2e)(
c−cL
)
·10PL +cL ·∆b≥ ∆a (2f)
Here, ∆b is assigned to every discretized variable
b allowing it to take up the value between two dis-
cretization points created due to the minimal value
of ℓ (Constraints (2a)–(2b)). Similarly, we allow
the product variable a to be increased with variable
∆a = ∆b · c. To approximate the product of the delta
variables, we use the McCormick envelope defined by
Constraints (2d)–(2f).
3 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMS
FOR APPROXIMATING
MAXMIN STRATEGIES
We now state the mathematical programs for approx-
imating maxmin strategies. The main idea is to add
bilinear constraints into the sequence form LP to re-
strict to imperfect recall strategies. We formulate an
exact bilinear program, followed by the approxima-
tion of bilinear terms using MDT.
3.1 Exact Bilinear Sequence Form
Against A-loss Recall Opponent
max
x,r,v
v(root, /0) (3a)
s.t. r( /0) = 1 (3b)
0≤ r(σ)≤ 1 ∀σ ∈ Σ1 (3c)
∑
a∈A(I)
r(σa) = r(σ) ∀σ ∈ Σ1,∀I ∈ inf1(σ1) (3d)
∑
a∈A(I)
x(a) = 1 ∀I ∈ I IR1 (3e)
0≤ x(a) ≤ 1 ∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀a ∈ A(I) (3f)
r(σ) · x(a) = r(σa) ∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀a ∈ A(I),
∀σ ∈ seq1(I) (3g)
∑
σ1∈Σ1
g(σ1,σ2a)r1(σ1)+ ∑
I′∈inf2(σ2a)
v(I′,σ2a)≥ v(I,σ2)
∀I ∈ I2,∀σ2 ∈ seq2(I),∀a ∈ A(I) (3h)
Constraints (3a)–(3h) represent a bilinear re-
formulation of the sequence-form LP due
to (von Stengel, 1996) applied to the informa-
tion set structure of an imperfect recall game G.
The objective of player 1 is to find a strategy that
maximizes the expected utility of the game. The
strategy is represented by variables r that assign
probability to a sequence: r(σ1) is the probability
that σ1 ∈ Σ1 will be played assuming that information
sets, in which actions of sequence σ1 are applicable,
are reached due to player 2. Probabilities r must
satisfy so-called network flow Constraints (3c)–(3d).
Finally, a strategy of player 1 is constrained by
the best-responding opponent that selects an ac-
tion minimizing the expected value in each I ∈ I2
and for each σ2 ∈ seq2(I) that was used to reach
I (Constraint (3h)). These constraints ensure that
the opponent plays the best response in the coarsest
perfect recall refinement of G and thus also in G
due to Lemma 2. The expected utility for each
action is a sum of the expected utility values from
immediately reachable information sets I′ and from
immediately reachable leafs. For the latter we use
generalized utility function g : Σ1×Σ2 → R defined
as g(σ1,σ2) = ∑z∈Z|seq1(z)=σ1∧seq2(z)=σ2 u(z)C (z).
In imperfect recall games multiple σi can lead to
some imperfect recall information set Ii ∈ I IRi ⊆ Ii;
hence, realization plans over sequences do not have
to induce the same behavioral strategy for Ii. There-
fore, for each Ii ∈ I IRi we define behavioral strategy
x(a) for each a∈A(Ii) (Constraints (3e)–(3f)). To en-
sure that the realization probabilities induce the same
behavioral strategy in Ii, we add bilinear constraint
r(σia) = x(a) · r(σi) (Constraint (3g)).
3.1.1 Player 2 without A-Loss Recall.
If player 2 does not have A-loss recall, the mathe-
matical program must use each pure best response of
player 2 pi2 ∈ Π2 as a constraint as follows:
max
x,r,v
v(root) (4a)
Constraints (3b)–(3f)
∑
z∈Z | pi2(z)=1
u(z)C (z)r(seq1(z))≥ v(root) ∀pi2 ∈ Π2 (4b)
Since the modification does not change the parts of
the program related to the approximation of strategies
of player 1, all the following approximation methods,
theorems, and the branch-and-bound algorithm are
applicable for general imperfect recall games without
absentminded players.
3.2 Upper Bound MILP Approximation
The upper bound formulation of the bilinear program
follows the MDT example and uses ideas similar to
Section 2.2. In accord with the MDT, we represent
every variable x(a) using a finite number of digits. Bi-
nary variables w
I1,a
k,ℓ correspond to wk,ℓ variables from
the example shown in Section 2.2 and are used for the
digit-wise discretization of x(a). Finally, rˆ(σ1)
a
k,ℓ cor-
respond to cˆk,ℓ variables used to discretize the bilinear
term r(σ1a). In order to allow variable x(a) to attain
an arbitrary value from [0,1] interval using a finite
number of digits of precision, we add an additional
real variable 0 ≤ ∆x(a) ≤ 10−P that can span the
gap between two adjacent discretization points. Con-
straints (5d) and (5e) describe this loosening. Vari-
ables ∆x(a) also have to be propagated to bilinear
terms r(σ1) · x(a) involving x(a). We cannot repre-
sent the product ∆r(σ1a) = r(σ1) ·∆x(a) exactly and
therefore we give bounds based on the McCormick
envelope (Constraints (5i)–(5j)).
max
x,r,v
v(root, /0) (5a)
s.t. Constraints (3b) - (3f) , (3h)
w
I,a
k,ℓ ∈ {0,1} ∀I ∈ I
IR
1 ,∀a ∈ A(I),
∀k ∈ 0..9,∀ℓ ∈ −P..0 (5b)
9
∑
k=0
w
I,a
k,ℓ = 1 ∀I ∈ I
IR
1 ,∀a ∈ A(I),
∀ℓ ∈ −P..0 (5c)
0
∑
ℓ=−P
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k ·w
I,a
k,ℓ+∆x(a) = x(a)
∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀a ∈ A(I) (5d)
0≤ ∆x(a) ≤ 10−P ∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀a ∈ A(I) (5e)
0≤ rˆ(σ)ak,ℓ ≤ w
I,a
k,ℓ ∀I ∈ I
IR
1 ,∀a ∈ A(I), (5f)
∀σ ∈ seq1(I),∀ℓ ∈ −P..0
9
∑
k=0
rˆ(σ)ak,ℓ = r(σ) ∀I ∈ I
IR
1 ,∀σ ∈ seq1(I)
∀ℓ ∈ −P..0 (5g)
0
∑
ℓ=−P
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k · rˆ(σ)ak,ℓ+∆r(σa) = r(σa)
∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀a ∈ A(I),
∀σ ∈ seq1(I) (5h)
(r(σ)−1) ·10−P+∆x(a)≤ ∆r(σa)≤ 10−P · r(σ)
∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀a ∈ A(I),
∀σ ∈ seq1(I) (5i)
0≤ ∆r(σa)≤ ∆x(a) ∀I ∈ I IR1 ,∀σ ∈ seq1(I),
∀a ∈ A(I) (5j)
Due to this loose representation of ∆r(σ1a), the refor-
mulation of bilinear terms is no longer exact and this
MILP therefore yields an upper bound of the bilinear
sequence form program (3). Note that the MILP has
both the number of variables and the number of con-
straints bounded by O(|I | · |Σ| ·P), where |Σ| is the
number of sequences of both players. The number of
binary variables is equal to 10 · |I IR1 | ·A
max
1 ·P, where
Amax1 =maxI∈I1 |A1(I)|.
3.3 Theoretical Analysis of the Upper
Bound MILP
The variables ∆x(a) and ∆r(σ) ensure that the opti-
mal value of the MILP is an upper bound on the value
of the bilinear program. The drawback is that the re-
alization probabilities do not have to induce a valid
strategy in the imperfect recall game G, i.e. if σ1,σ2
are two sequences leading to an imperfect recall in-
formation set I1 ∈ I IR1 where action a ∈ A(I1) can be
played, r(σ1a)/r(σ1) need not equal r(σ2a)/r(σ2).
We will show that it is possible to create a valid strat-
egy inGwhich decreases the value by at most ε, while
deriving bound on this ε.
Let β1(I1), . . . ,β
k(I1) be behavioral strategies in
the imperfect recall information set I1 ∈ I IR1 corre-
sponding to realization probabilities of continuations
of sequences σ1, . . . ,σk leading to I1. These probabil-
ity distributions can be obtained from the realization
plan as β j(I1,a) = r(σ
ja)/r(σ j) for σ j ∈ seq1(I1) and
a ∈ A(I1). We will omit the information set and use
β(a) whenever it is clear from the context. If the im-
perfect recall is violated in I1, β
j(a)may not be equal
to βl(a) for some j, l and action a ∈ A(I1).
Proposition 1. It is always possible to construct a
strategy β(I1) such that ‖β(I1)−β
j(I1)‖1 ≤ |A(I1)| ·
10−P for every j.2
We now connect the distance of a corrected
strategy β(I1) from a set of behavioral strategies
β1(I1), . . . ,β
k(I1) in I1 ∈ I IR1 to the expected value of
the strategy.
Theorem 1. The error of the Upper Bound MILP is
bounded by
ε = 10−P ·d ·Amax1 ·
vmax( /0)−vmin( /0)
2
,
where d is the maximum number of player 1’s
imperfect recall information sets encountered on a
path from the root to a terminal node, Amax1 =
maxI1∈I IR1
|A(I1)| is the branching factor and vmin( /0),
vmax( /0) are the lowest and highest utilities for player
1 in the whole game, respectively.
The idea of the proof is to bound the error in ev-
ery I1 ∈ I IR1 and propagate the error in a bottom-up
fashion.
The error of Upper Bound MILP is bounded if the
precision of all approximations of bilinear terms is P.
2The L1 norm is taken as ‖x1−x2‖1 =∑a∈A(I1) |x1(a)−
x2(a)|
However, we can increase the precision for each term
separately and thus design the following iterative al-
gorithm (termed simply as MILP in the experiments):
(1) start with the precision set to 0 for all bilinear
terms, (2) for each approximation of a bilinear term
calculate the current error contribution (the difference
between ∆r(σ1a) and r(σ1)∆x(a) multiplied by the
expected utility) and increase the precision only for
the term that contributes to the overall error the most.
Once the term with maximal error has already reached
maximal precision P, Theorem 1 guarantees us that
we are ε close to the optimal solution. Our algorithm
in the following section simultaneously increases the
precision for approximating bilinear terms together
with searching for optimal values for binary variables.
4 BRANCH-AND-BOUND
ALGORITHM
We now introduce a branch-and-bound (BNB) search
for approximatingmaxmin strategies, that exploits the
observation below and thus improves the performance
compared to the previous MILP formulations. Addi-
tionally, we provide bounds on the overall runtime as
a function of the desired precision.
The BNB algorithmworks on the linear relaxation
of the Upper Bound MILP and searches the BNB tree
in the best first search manner. In every node n, the al-
gorithm solves the relaxed LP corresponding to node
n, heuristically selects the information set I and ac-
tion a contributing to the current approximation er-
ror the most, and creates successors of n by restrict-
ing the probability β1(I,a) that a is played in I. The
algorithm adds new constraints to LP depending on
the value of β1(I,a) by constraining (and/or introduc-
ing new) variables w
I1,a
k,l and creating successors of the
BNB node in the search tree. Note that w
I1,a
k,l variables
correspond to binary variables in the MILP formula-
tion. This way, the algorithm simultaneously searches
for the optimal approximation of bilinear terms as
well as the assignment for binary variables. The al-
gorithm terminates when ε-optimal strategy is found
(using the difference of the global upper bound and
the lower bound computed as described in Observa-
tion 1 below).
Observation 1. Even if the current assignment to
variables w
I1,a
k,ℓ is not feasible (they are not set to bi-
nary values), the realization plan produced is valid
in the perfect recall refinement. We can fix it in the
sense of Proposition 1 and use it to estimate the lower
bound for the BNB subtree rooted in the current node
Algorithm 1: BNB algorithm
input : Initial LP relaxation LP0 of Upper
Bound MILP using a P= 0
discretization
output : ε-optimal strategy for a player having
imperfect recall
parameters: Bound on maximum error ε, precision
bounds for x(a) variables Pmax(I1,a)
1 fringe← {CreateNode(LP0)}
2 opt← (nil,−∞,∞)
3 while fringe 6=∅ do
4 (LP, lb,ub)← argmaxn∈fringe n.ub
5 fringe← fringe \ (LP, lb,ub)
6 if opt.lb≥ n.ub then
7 return ReconstructStrategy(opt)
8 if opt.lb< n.lb then
9 opt← n
10 if n.ub−n.lb ≤ ε then
11 return ReconstructStrategy(opt)
12 else
13 (I1,a)← SelectAction(n)
14 P← number of digits of precision
representing x(a) in LP
15 fringe← fringe∪{CreateNode(LP∪
{∑
⌊
aub+alb
2
⌋−P
k=0 w
I1,a
k,P = 1})}
16 fringe← fringe∪{CreateNode(LP∪
{∑9
k=⌊
aub+alb
2
⌋−P
w
I1,a
k,P = 1})}
17 if P< Pmax(I1,a) then
18 fringe← fringe∪{CreateNode(LP∪
{w
I1,a
LP.x(a)−P,P
= 1, introduce vars
w
I1,a
0,P+1, . . . ,w
I1,a
9,P+1 and corresponding
constraints from MDT })}
19 return ReconstructStrategy(opt)
20 function CreateNode(LP)
21 ub← Solve(LP)
22 β1 ← ReconstructStrategy(LP)
23 lb← u1(β1,BestResponse(β1))
24 return (LP, lb,ub)
without a complete assignment of all w
I1,a
k,ℓ variables
to either 0 or 1.
Algorithm 1 depicts the complete BNB algorithm.
It takes an LP relaxation of the Upper Bound MILP
as its input. Initially, the maxmin strategy is approx-
imated using 0 digits of precision after the decimal
point (i.e. precision P(I1,a) = 0 for every variable
x(a)). The algorithm maintains a set of active BNB
nodes (fringe) and a candidate with the best guaran-
teed value opt. The algorithm selects the node with
the highest upper bound from fringe at each itera-
tion (lines 4–5). If there is no potential for improve-
ment in the unexplored parts of the branch and bound
tree, the current best solution is returned (line 7) (up-
per bounds of the nodes added to the fringe in the
future will never be higher than the current upper
bound). Next, we check, whether the current solu-
tion has better lower bound than the current best, if
yes we replace it (line 9). Since we always select
the most promising node with respect to the upper
bound, we are sure that if the lower bound and up-
per bound have distance at most ε, we have found
an ε-optimal solution and we can terminate (line 11)
(upper bounds of the nodes added to the fringe in
the future will never be higher than the current up-
per bound). Otherwise, we heuristically select an ac-
tion having the highest effect on the gap between the
current upper and lower bound (line 13). We obtain
the precision used to represent behavioral probabil-
ity of this action. By default we add two successors
of the current BNB node, each with one of the fol-
lowing constraints. x(a) ≤ ⌊ aub+alb
2
⌋−P (line 15) and
x(a)≥ ⌊ aub+alb
2
⌋−P (line 16), where ⌊·⌋p is flooring of
a number towards p digits of precision and aub and
alb are the lowest and highest allowed values of play-
ing x(a). This step performs binary halving restricting
allowed values of x(a) in current precision. Addition-
ally, if the current precision is lower than the maximal
precision Pmax(I1,a) the gap between bounds may be
caused by the lack of discretization points; hence, we
add one more successor ⌊v⌋ ≤ x(a)≤ ⌈v⌉, where v is
the current probability of playing a, while increasing
the precision used for representing x(a) (line 18) (all
the restriction to x(a) in all 3 cases are done via wI1,ak,l
variables).
The function CreateNode computes the upper
bound by solving the given LP (line 21) and the lower
bound, by using the heuristical construction of a valid
strategy β1 returning some convex combination of
strategies found for σk1 ∈ seq1(I1) (line 22) and com-
puting the expected value of β1 against a best re-
sponse to it.
Note that this algorithm allows us to plug-in cus-
tom heuristic for the reconstruction of strategies (line
22) and for the action selection (line 13).
4.1 Theoretical Properties of the BNB
Algorithm
The BNB algorithm takes the error bound ε as an in-
put. We provide a method for setting the Pmax(I1,a)
parameters appropriately to guarantee ε-optimality.
Finally, we provide a bound on the number of steps
the algorithm needs to terminate.
Theorem 2. Let Pmax(I1,a) be the maximum number
of digits of precision used for representing variable
x(a) set as
Pmax(I1,a) =
⌈
max
h∈I1
log10
|A(I1)| ·d · vdi f f (h)
2ε
⌉
,
where vdi f f (h) = vmax(h)− vmin(h). With this setting
Algorithm 1 terminates and it is guaranteed to return
an ε-optimal strategy for player 1.
The proof provides a bound on the error per node
in every I ∈ I IRi and propagates this bound through
the game tree in a bottom up fashion.
Theorem 3. When using Pmax(I1,a) from The-
orem 2 for all I1 ∈ I1 and all a ∈ A(I1),
the number of iterations of the BNB algo-
rithm needed to find an ε-optimal solution is
in O(34S1(log10(S1·vdi f f ( /0))+1)2−5S1ε−5S1), where S1 =
|I1|Amax1 .
The proof derives a bound on the num-
ber of nodes in the BNB tree dependent on
maxI1∈Ii,a∈A1(I1)Pmax(I1,a) and uses the formula from
Theorem 2 to transform the bound to a function of ε.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We now demonstrate the practical aspects of our main
branch-and-boundalgorithm (BNB) described in Sec-
tion 4 and the iterativeMILP variant described in Sec-
tion 3. We compare the algorithms on a set of ran-
dom games where player 2 has A-loss recall. Both
algorithms were implemented in Java, each algorithm
uses a single thread, 8 GBmemory limit. We use IBM
ILOG CPLEX 12.6 to solve all LPs/MILPs.
5.1 Random Games
Since there is no standardized collection of bench-
mark EFGs, we use randomly generated games in
order to obtain statistically significant results. We
randomly generate a perfect recall game with vary-
ing branching factor and fixed depth of 6. To control
the information set structure, we use observations as-
signed to every action – for player i, nodes h with
the same observations generated by all actions in his-
tory belong to the same information set. In order to
obtain imperfect recall games with a non-trivial in-
formation set structure, we run a random abstraction
algorithm which randomly merges information sets
with the same action count, which do not cause ab-
sentmindedness. We generate a set of experimen-
tal instances by varying the branching factor. Such
games are rather difficult to solve since (1) informa-
tion sets can spanmultiple levels of the game tree (i.e.,
the nodes in an information set often have histories
with differing sizes) and (2) actions can easily lead to
leafs with very differing utility values. We always de-
vise an abstraction which results to A-loss recall for
the minimizing player.
Table 1: Average runtime and standard error in seconds
needed to solve at least 100 different random games in ev-
ery setting, while increasing the b.f.with fixed depth of 6.
Algs \ b. f . 3 4
MILP 157.87± 61.47 459.09± 75.95
BNB 9.52± 3.78 184.50± 48.22
5.2 Results
Table 1 reports the average runtime and its standard
error in seconds for both algorithms over at least 100
different random games with increasing branching
factor and fixed depth of 6. We limited the runtime
for 1 instance to 2 hours (in the Table we report results
only for instances where both algorithms finished un-
der 2 hours). The BNB algorithm was terminated 17
and 30 times after 2 hours for the reported settings
respectively, while MILP algorithm was terminated
19 and 34 times. Note that the random games form
an unfavorable scenario for both algorithms since the
construction of the abstraction is completely random,
which makes conflicting behavior in merged informa-
tion sets common. As we can see, however, even in
these scenarios we are typically able to solve games
with approximately 5 ·103 states in several minutes.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We provide the first algorithm for approximat-
ing maxmin strategies in imperfect recall zero-sum
extensive-formgames without absentmindedness. We
give a novel mathematical formulation for computing
approximate strategies by means of a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) that uses recent methods in the
approximation of bilinear terms. Next, we use a linear
relaxation of this MILP and introduce a branch-and-
bound search (BNB) that simultaneously looks for the
correct solution of binary variables and increases the
precision for the approximation of bilinear terms. We
provide guarantees that both MILP and BNB find an
approximate optimal solution. Finally, we show that
the algorithms are capable of solving games of sizes
far beyond toy problems (up to 5 ·103 states) typically
within few minutes in practice.
Results presented in this paper provide the first
baseline algorithms for the class of imperfect recall
games that are of a great importance in solving large
extensive-form games with perfect recall. As such,
our algorithms can be further extended to improve
the current scalability, e.g., by employing incremental
strategy generation methods.
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APPENDIX
Proposition 1. It is always possible to construct a
strategy β(I1) such that ‖β(I1)−β
j(I1)‖1 ≤ |A(I1)| ·
10−P for every j.
Proof. Probabilities of playing action a in β1, . . . ,βk
can differ by at most 10−P, i.e. |β j(a)−βl(a)| ≤ 10−P
for every j, l and action a ∈ A(I1). This is based on
the MDT we used to discretize the bilinear program.
Let us denote
r(σ1a) =
0
∑
l=−P
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k · rˆ(σ1)
a
k,ℓ (6)
x(I1,a) =
0
∑
l=−P
9
∑
k=0
10ℓ · k ·w
I1,a
k,ℓ . (7)
Constraints (5f) and (5g) ensure that r(σ1a) =
r(σ1) · x(I1,a). The only way how the imper-
fect recall can be violated is thus in the usage of
∆r(σ1a). We know however that ∆r(σ1a) ≤ 10
−P ·
r(σ1) which ensures that the amount of imbalance in
β1, . . . ,βk is at most 10−P. Taking any of the behav-
ioral strategies β1, . . . ,βk as the corrected behavioral
strategy β(I1) therefore satisfies ‖β(I1)− β
j(I1)‖1 ≤
∑a∈A(I1) 10
−P = |A(I1)| ·10
−P.
We now provide the technical proof of Theorem
1. First, we connect the distance of a corrected
strategy β(I1) from a set of behavioral strategies
β1(I1), . . . ,β
k(I1) in I1 ∈ I IR1 to the expected value of
the strategy. We start with bounding this error in a
single node.
Lemma 3. Let h ∈ I1 be a history and β
1, β2 be be-
havioral strategies (possibly prescribing different be-
havior in I1) prescribing the same distribution over
actions for all subsequent histories h′ ⊐ h. Let
vmax(h) and vmin(h) be maximal and minimal utilities
of player 1 in the subtree of h, respectively. Then the
following holds:
|vβ1(h)−vβ2 (h)| ≤
vdi f f (h)
2
· ‖β1(I1)−β
2(I1)‖1,
where vβ j (h) is the maxmin value u(β
j,βBR2 ) of strat-
egy β j of player 1 given the play starts in h and
vdi f f (h) = vmax(h)− vmin(h).
Proof. Let us study strategies β1 and β2 in node h.
Let us take β1(I1) as a baseline and transform it to-
wards β2(I1). We can identify two subsets of A(I1)
— a set of actions A+ where the probability of play-
ing the action in β2 was increased and A− where the
probability was decreased. Let us denote
C◦ = ∑
a∈A◦
|β1(I1,a)−β
2(I1,a)| ∀◦ ∈ {+,−}.
We know that C+ = C− (as strategies have to be
probability distributions). Moreover we know that
‖β1(I1)−β
2(I1)‖1 =C
++C−. In the worst case, de-
creasing the probability of playing action a∈ A− risks
losing quantity proportional to the amount of this de-
crease multiplied by the highest utility in the subtree
vmax(h). For all actions a ∈ A
− this loss is equal to
vmax(h) · ∑
a∈A−
|β1(I1,a)−β
2(I1,a)|= vmax(h) ·C
−.
Similarly the increase of the probabilities of actions
in A+ can add in the worst case vmin(h) ·C
+ to the
value of the strategy. This combined together yields
vβ2 (h)−vβ1(h)≥−vmax(h) ·C
−+vmin(h) ·C
+
= [−vmax(h)+vmin(h)] ·C
+
=
−vmax(h)+vmin(h)
2
·2C+
=
−vmax(h)+vmin(h)
2
· ‖β1(I1)−β
2(I1)‖1.
The strategies β1, β2 are interchangeable which re-
sults in the final bound on the difference of vβ2(h),
vβ1(h).
Now we are ready to bound the error in the whole
game tree.
Theorem 1. The error of the Upper Bound MILP is
bounded by
ε = 10−P ·d ·Amax1 ·
vmax( /0)−vmin( /0)
2
,
where d is the maximum number of player 1’s
imperfect recall information sets encountered on a
path from the root to a terminal node, Amax1 =
maxI1∈I IR1
|A(I1)| is the branching factor and vmin( /0),
vmax( /0) are the lowest and highest utilities for player
1 in the whole game, respectively.
Proof. We show an inductive way to compute the
bound on the error and we show that the bound from
Theorem 1 is its upper bound. Throughout the deriva-
tion we assume that the opponent plays to maximize
the error bound. We proceed in a bottom-up fashion
over the nodes in the game tree, computing the max-
imum loss L(h) player 1 could have accumulated by
correcting his behavioral strategy in the subtree of h,
i.e.
L(h)≥ uh(β
0)−uh(β
IR),
where β0 is the (incorrect) behavioral strategy of
player 1 acting according to the realization probabili-
ties r(σ) from the solution of the Upper Bound MILP,
βIR is its corrected version and uh(β) is the expected
utility of a play starting in history h when player 1
plays according to β and his opponent best responds
(without knowing that the play starts in h). The proof
follows in case to case manner.
(1) No corrections are made in subtrees of leafs h,
thus the loss L(h) = 0.
(2) The chance player selects one of the succes-
sor nodes based on the fixed probability distribution.
The loss is then the expected loss over all child nodes
L(h) = ∑a∈A(h)L(h · a) ·C (h · a)/C (h). In the worst
case, the chance player selects the child with the high-
est associated loss, therefore
L(h)≤ max
a∈A(h)
L(h ·a).
(3) Player 2 wants to maximize player 1’s loss.
Therefore she selects such an action in her node h
that leads to a node with the highest loss, L(h) ≤
maxa∈A(n)L(h · a). This is a pessimistic estimate of
the loss as she may not be able to pick the maximiz-
ing action in every state because of the imperfection
of her information.
(4) If player 1’s node h is not a part of an imper-
fect recall information set, no corrective steps need
to be taken. The expected loss at node h is there-
fore L(h) = ∑a∈A(h)β
0(h,a)L(h · a). Once again in
the worst case player 1’s behavioral strategy β0(h) se-
lects deterministically the child node with the highest
associated loss, therefore L(h)≤maxa∈A(h)L(h ·a).
(5) So far we have considered cases that only ag-
gregate losses from child nodes. If player 1’s node
h is part of an imperfect recall information set, the
correction step may have to be taken. Let β−h be a
behavioral strategy where corrective steps have been
taken for successors of h and let us construct a strat-
egy βh where the strategy was corrected in the whole
subtree of h (i.e. including h). Note that ultimately
we want to construct strategy β /0 = βIR.
We know that values of children have been de-
creased by at most maxa∈A(h)L(h ·a), hence vβ0(h)−
vβ−h(h) ≤ maxa∈A(h)L(h · a). Then we have to take
the corrective step at the node h and construct strat-
egy βh. From Lemma 3 and the observation about the
maximum distance of behavioral strategies within a
single imperfect recall information set I1, we get:
vβ−h(h)−vβh (h)≤
vdi f f (h)
2
·10−P|A1(I1)|
≤
vdi f f ( /0)
2
·10−PAmax1
The loss in the subtree of h is equal to vβ0(h)−
vβ−h(h) which is bounded by
L(h) = vβ0(h)−vβh (h)
=
[
vβ−h (h)−vβh (h)
]
+
[
vβ0(h)−vβ−h (h)
]
≤
vdi f f ( /0)
2
·10−PAmax1 + max
a∈A(h)
L(h ·a).
We will now provide an explicit bound on the
loss in the root node L( /0). We have shown that
in order to prove the worst case bound it suffices
to consider deterministic choice of action at every
node — this means that a single path in the game
tree is pursued during propagation of loss. The loss
is increased exclusively in imperfect recall nodes
and we can encounter at most d such nodes on any
path from the root. The increase in such nodes
is constant ([vmax( /0)− vmin( /0)] · 10
−PAmax1 /2), there-
fore the bound is ε = L( /0) ≤ [vmax( /0)− vmin( /0)] · d ·
10−PAmax1 /2.
We now know that the expected value of the strat-
egy we have found lies within the interval [v∗− ε,v∗],
where v∗ is the optimal value of the Upper Bound
MILP. As v∗ is an upper bound on the solution of the
original bilinear program, no strategy can be better
than v∗ — which means that the strategy we found is
ε-optimal.
Theorem 2. Let Pmax(I1,a) be the maximum number
of digits of precision used for representing variable
x(a) set as
Pmax(I1,a) =
⌈
max
h∈I1
log10
|A(I1)| ·d · vdi f f (h)
2ε
⌉
,
where vdi f f (h) = vmax(h)−vmin(h). With this setting,
Algorithm 1 terminates and it is guaranteed to return
an ε-optimal strategy for player 1.
Proof. We start by proving that Algorithm 1 with this
choice of Pmax(I1,a) terminates. We will show that
every branch of the branch-and-bound search tree is
finite. This together with the fact that every node is
visited at most once and the branching factor of the
search tree is finite (every node of the search tree has
at most 3 child nodes) ensures that the algorithm ter-
minates.
Every node of the search tree is tied to branch-
ing on some variable x(a). Let p be the current pre-
cision used to represent x(a) and let us consider the
first node on the branch where x(a) is represented
with such precision. At such point, p− 1 digits are
fixed and thus x ∈ [c,c+10−(p−1)] for some c∈ [0,1].
On line 18 an interval of size 10−p is handled, every
left/right operation (lines 15 and 16) may thus handle
an interval whose size is reduced at least by 10−p. We
can conduct at most 9 left/right branching operations
(lines 15 and 16) before the size of the interval drops
below 10−p, which forces us to increase p. At most
10 operations can be performed on every x(a) for ev-
ery precision p, the limit on p is finite for every such
variable and the number of variables is finite as well,
the branch has therefore to terminate.
Let us now show that these limits on the number
of refinements Pmax(I1,a) are enough to guarantee ε-
optimality. We will refer the reader to the proof of
Theorem 1 for details while we focus exclusively on
the behavior in nodes from imperfect recall informa-
tion sets.
Let I1 ∈ I IR1 and h ∈ I1. We know that the L1 dis-
tance between behavioral strategies in I1 is at most
10−Pmax(I1,a) · |A(I1)| (for any a ∈ A(I1)). This means
that the bound on L(h) in h from the proof of Theo-
rem 1 is modified to:
L(h) = vβ0(h)−vβh (h)
=
[
vβ−h(h)−vβh (h)
]
+
[
vβ0(h)−vβ−h (h)
]
≤
vdi f f (h)
2
·10−Pmax(I1,a) · |A(I1)|+ max
a∈A(h)
L(h ·a)
≤
vdi f f (h)
2
·
|A(I1)| ·2ε
|A(I1)| ·d · [vdi f f (h)]
+ max
a∈A(h)
L(h ·a)
=
ε
d
+ max
a∈A(h)
L(h ·a).
Similarly with the reasoning in the proof of Theo-
rem 1, it suffices to assume players choosing action at
every node in a deterministic way. The path induced
by these choices contains at most d imperfect recall
nodes, thus L( /0) = d · ε/d = ε.
Theorem 3. When using Pmax(I1,a) from The-
orem 2 for all I1 ∈ I1 and all a ∈ A(I1),
the number of iterations of the BNB algo-
rithm needed to find an ε-optimal solution is
in O(34S1(log10(S1·vdi f f ( /0))+1)2−5S1ε−5S1), where S1 =
|I1|Amax1 .
Proof. We start by proving that there is
N ∈ O(34|I1|A
max
1 Pmax) nodes in the BnB
tree, where Amax1 = maxI∈I1 |A(I)| and
Pmax = maxI∈I1,a∈A(I)Pmax(I,a). This holds since in
the worst case we branch for every action in every
information set (hence |I1|A1). We can bound the
number of branchings for a fixed action by 4Pmax,
since there are 10 digits (we branch at most 4 times
using binary halving) and we might require Pmax
number of digits of precision. 4|I1|Amax1 Pmax is
therefore the maximum depth of the branch-and-
bound tree. Finally the branching factor of the
branch-and-bound tree is at most 3.
By substituting
max
I1∈I1
⌈
max
h∈I1
log10
|A(I1)| ·d · vdi f f (h)
2ε
⌉
for Pmax in the above bound (Theorem 2), we obtain
N ∈ O(3
4S1maxI1∈I1
⌈
maxh∈I1 log10
|A(I1)|·d·vdi f f (h)
2ε
⌉
),
where S1 = |I1|A
max
1
∈ O(3
4S1maxI1∈I1
⌈
log10
|A(I1)|·d·vdi f f ( /0)
2ε
⌉
)
∈ O(3
4S1maxI1∈I1
⌈
log10
S1vdi f f ( /0)
2ε
⌉
)
∈ O(3
4S1
⌈
log10
S1 ·vdi f f ( /0)
2ε
⌉
)
∈ O(34S1(log10
S1 ·vdi f f ( /0)
2ε +1))
∈ O(34S1(log10(S1·vdi f f ( /0))−log10(2ε)+1))
∈ O(34S1(log10 S1·vdi f f ( /0))+1)3−10S1 log10(2ε))
∈ O(34S1(log10 S1·vdi f f ( /0))+1)3
−10S1
log3(2ε)
log3(10) )
∈ O(34S1(log10 S1·vdi f f ( /0))+1)(2ε)
−10S1
log3(10) )
∈ O(34S1(log10(S1·vdi f f ( /0))+1)(2ε)−5S1 )
